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ABSTRACT
This paper explores women’s entrepreneurial activities in the Oman and
Qatar in light of the state attention given to promoting
entrepreneurship in the region over the past decade. In the Gulf Arab
countries, like in many rapidly developing economies, neoliberal growth
discourse abounds. Along with this, the promotion of entrepreneurship
and embrace of individual enterprise is paramount. Despite the
dominance of the state in political and economic spaces, Gulf
governments have embraced the rhetoric of the market and
entrepreneurship. Drawing from semi-structured interviews, focus
groups, and participant observation conducted between 2011 and 2015,
this paper examines this phenomenon. In a region stereotyped with
weak gender development outcomes, female entrepreneurship is largely
cast as a positive development aimed at liberating and empowering
women through individual enterprise. In contrast, this paper finds that
the same forces that are meant to empower women often reproduce or
reinforce certain gender norms while introducing new forms of
dependency. Gulf female entrepreneurs confront competing tensions
within three intersecting political economy logics: the structural logic of
the economy, the logic of development narratives, and the logic of
socio-economic organisation.
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Introduction
This paper explores the facets of female entrepreneurship promotion in Oman and Qatar to analyse
the broader entrepreneurship agenda in the Gulf region.1 The top-down promotion of entrepreneur-
ship across Gulf Arab states has been a prominent feature of the regional development programme
over the past decade. All six states actively promote entrepreneurship and cast it as central to
employment, private sector development, innovation, and diversification strategies. Examining
how this unfolds in two diverse countries within the region not only sheds lights on global develop-
ment policy frameworks but also on the challenges of resource dependency, and the rationale,
means, and efficacy of such economic policies. This paper specifically centres on gender not only
because female entrepreneurship has received a loud push throughout the region, but also
because it uncovers real tensions in economic and academic treatments of Gulf women.
Despite global rates of female entrepreneurship expanding, studies suggest that less than 10 per
cent of entrepreneurship research focuses on these entrepreneurs (Brush and Cooper 2012: 1, Welsh
et al. 2013: 2). Even fewer examine gender and entrepreneurship with a critical lens. This is especially
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true of work on Middle Eastern and Gulf entrepreneurs. One of the few studies that looks at entre-
preneurship in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) from a critical, feminist perspective is Altan-
Olcay (2014).
This paper shows how gender intersects with entrepreneurship and how together their intersec-
tions with neoliberalism and broader economic transitions like rising consumerism, a growing middle
class, and weakening commodity markets inform understandings of entrepreneurship ecosystems,
economic relations, and socio-economic and political change. This is significant because it extends
scholarship on the political economy of neoliberal development in the non-West and the conse-
quences of oil dependency while expanding engagement with the controversial issues of gender
and the economy in the Arab and Muslim world. It also challenges common misconceptions of
the region as duly exceptional because of oil or Islam and therefore not subject to global neoliberal
economic pressures and transformations. Moving beyond these tired caricatures of the Gulf allows us
to bring the region back into international political economy scholarship on topics beyond oil
markets.
Primary data for this project were gathered between 2011 and 2015 from 40 semi-structured inter-
views with policy makers in the Oman and Qatar, 40 with entrepreneurship initiative directors and
academics, and 30 deep interviews and 5 focus groups with female entrepreneurs and aspiring entre-
preneurs. The entrepreneurs interviewed came from a cross-section of social classes, with a majority
of the millennial generation. These data were supplemented with participant observation in multiple
entrepreneurship training events, educational activities, entrepreneurship competitions, small- and
medium-sized enterprise (SME) promotion forums, entrepreneur support groups, and conferences.
Drawing from these findings, this paper offers a critical analysis of female entrepreneurship pro-
motion in Oman and Qatar. Situated on opposite ends of the Gulf wealth spectrum, these cases have
been selected to reflect the diversity of economic conditions and challenges in the region. This paper
uses the nascent entrepreneurial ecosystems in Oman and Qatar as sites to evaluate the intersection
of female entrepreneurship promotion in Gulf rentier economies with the political peculiarities of
autocracy and neoliberalism and the economic realities of hydrocarbon dependence and foreign
labour abundance. The paper demonstrates that Gulf female entrepreneurs confront competing ten-
sions within three intersecting and overlapping political economy logics that shape and constrain
their economic interaction: the structural logic of the economy, the logic of development narratives,
and the logic of socio-economic organisation.
Theorising female entrepreneurship promotion in the Gulf
It may appear paradoxical that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments have embraced the
rhetoric of the market and entrepreneurship. These same states are known as autocracies character-
ised by the dominance of the state in political and economic spaces. And yet, in Oman and Qatar, like
in their other GCC neighbours, neoliberal growth discourse is pervasive and frequently coupled with
entrepreneurship advocacy and the embrace of individual enterprise (Ennis 2015). Why do these
autocratic, wealthy political economies so actively promote entrepreneurship, and female entrepre-
neurship in particular, and how do local women respond to the entrepreneurship agenda? Through
exploring this question, this paper contributes to the broader debate over the ostensible contradic-
tion but emergent complementarity between neoliberalism and authoritarianism (Abboud 2013,
Hanieh 2013, Bruff 2014).
The terms neoliberal, neoliberalism, and the idea of something becoming neoliberalised run into
difficult definitional territory. The very idea of neoliberalism has been the victim of such wide concept
stretching, it risks losing its analytical value. Here I engage two meanings of neoliberalism featured in
academic debates. First, neoliberalism is an economic ideology associated with the privileging of free
markets, growth, and private enterprise as represented by the thinking of Friedrich Hayek and Milton
Friedman. This ideology emerged as a political project in the 1980s and 1990s in the international
political economy, advocating privatisation, deregulation, and liberalisation as generalisable
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strategies for development across the world (Williamson 1990). Second, neoliberalism can be used to
express a (perhaps manufactured) cultural consensus around markets and economic rationalities
which is utilised by governments to both galvanise support for policies and engender responsible
citizens (Barry et al. 1996, Harvey 2005).
Despite appearing contradictory, governments across a wide range of political spectrums have
been adopting aspects of neoliberalism and integrating it with existing authoritarian practices and
developmentalist policies. Scholars have pointed to the emergence of ‘neoliberal developmentalism’
(Liow 2012, Lai and Samers 2017), ‘patrimonial capitalism’ (Schlumberger 2008), and ‘authoritarian
neoliberalism’ (Bruff 2012) to explain this pattern. Likewise, research focused on the Middle East
increasingly shows the predominance of neoliberalism occurring alongside secular and religious
authoritarianism (Guazzone and Pioppi 2009, Hanieh 2011, Kanna 2011, Buckley 2012, Yesil 2016),
noting a shift from state developmentalism to ‘intrinsically authoritarian modalities of neoliberal gov-
ernment’ (Bogaert 2013: 215). Where the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism has been observed across
Western democracies (Bruff 2014), a similar melding of authoritarianism and neoliberalism is
observed across states with recent histories of rapid economic development. The latter ‘seem to
be converging on a style of governance that places an ethos of regulated self-reliance at its core’
(Honeyman 2016: 5–6).
The top-down promotion of entrepreneurship in Oman and Qatar is one example of this pattern.
The rationale of female entrepreneurship promotion in the Gulf is rooted in two overlapping
accounts, economic, and ideological. I set these forth below, and illustrate their multiple facets
across three political economy logics throughout the remainder of the paper.
The first account is grounded in a story of economic necessity – the imperative of economic diver-
sification, growth, and private sector jobs for citizens. The promotion of entrepreneurship and SMEs
in the Gulf, then, is underlined by a two-pronged economic rationale. The first, and key, is a desire for
the type of entrepreneurship which prompts innovation required for growing and diversifying econ-
omies heavily dependent on hydrocarbon export. The diversification imperative is felt with acute
depth when oil prices reach lows such as those experienced in 2015 and 2016 – critically restricting
state revenue and expenditure. Although the necessity of diversifying the economy has been fea-
tured in development plans and reports since the 1970s in many Gulf countries, it is especially
during periods of oil lows that the urgency feels exigent.
Intrinsic to this discussion, sharp revenue declines constrain the ability of the state to function in
its traditional role as the primary employer for Gulf nationals. Thus, the second aspect of this account
is connected to the first, yet at a more basic level of employment provision. Entrepreneurship carries
with it the hope of contributing to one of the region’s largest problems, private sector jobs for Gulf
citizens. Entrepreneurship becomes a way for nationals to engage in a private sector. Despite also
being cloaked in the language of innovation, this type of entrepreneurship promotion is more
akin to microenterprise initiatives and focuses on self-employment programmes encouraging
nationals to create their own private sector employment.
Gulf nationals are poorly represented in the private sector, and find most of their employment in
the public sector. Unemployment among women is high. In the broader Middle East, the female
unemployment rate in 2010 was 18.1 per cent compared to a global average of 6.4 per cent
(OECD 2014: 43). In Gulf countries, the youth unemployment rate is double national averages. Con-
servative estimates place these from 10 to 30 per cent in all GCC countries but Qatar (Oxford Business
Group 2016: 20). Even though Qatar’s youth unemployment rate is quite low comparatively, 76.4 per
cent of discouraged jobseekers are women indicating the greater difficulty women have securing
employment (‘The Global Gender Report 2017’ 2017: 279). Although the gender gap for jobs that
require advanced qualifications is much lower than in occupational categories that require fewer qua-
lifications, female millennials are the worst affected by poor unemployment statistics. Nearly half of
young women seeking work in the region are unable to find it despite comprising such a small
number of job seekers (OECD 2014: 43, 51–52). The promotion of entrepreneurship allows the
state to encourage a form of employment in the private sector, without necessarily addressing
NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 3
underlying structures which make the private sector so unattractive to citizens and, particularly,
female citizens. These conditions are outlined in the next section.
The ideological account of female entrepreneurship promotion is connected to the economic one,
in that it uses the narrative of economic explanations and solutions to development challenges. In a
region stereotyped with weak gender development outcomes, female entrepreneurship is cast as a
positive development aimed at liberating and empowering women through individual enterprise. It
becomes yet another means through which Western-rooted ideologies and institutions can ‘save’
and liberate women in the Middle East (Spivak 1988, Abu-Lughod 2002, Roberts 2015). In contrast,
this paper finds that the same forces that are meant to empower women, while on the one hand suc-
ceeding, on the other often reproduce or reinforce gender norms while introducing new forms of
subjugation. This account of female entrepreneurship is grounded across multiple levels of develop-
mental governance – global, regional, and local. It is rooted in a neoliberal rationality, which is influ-
enced by and in turns influences local interpretations of gender, culture, and religion.
The promotion of entrepreneurship in the Gulf reflects a certain global pulse. Indeed, entrepre-
neurship is high on the global development agenda, and prominently featured within the 2030
UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Three of the 17 SDGs (4, 8, and 9) specifically reference
entrepreneurship, indicating its significance to the sustainable development agenda (United Nations
2015). Along with UN bodies, leading international financial institutions (IFIs) like the IMF, World Bank,
WEF, among others have put forward entrepreneurship alongside their policy reforms since the turn
of the millennium. This advice intensified after the global financial crisis and the Arab uprisings. In
fact, the 2016 Arab Human Development Report highlights the critical role of youth entrepreneurship
for responding to the regional need to create more than 60 million new jobs over the next decade for
new labour force entrants (UNDP 2016: 32). Correspondingly, a World Bank report explains why ‘we’
ought to be concerned about women’s entrepreneurship in the Middle East. ‘Unlocking women’s
skills and creativity’, it claims, ‘can critically contribute to the testing of new ideas and increasing com-
petiveness in the global marketplace’ (World Bank 2007, forward). The report further suggests that
‘promoting women’s entrepreneurship’ in the region is important for diversification and to ‘create
more and better jobs’ (World Bank 2007, forward).
At the regional level, policy advice from IFIs and consultancies to encourage entrepreneurship is
embraced and pushed forward by the state. Entrepreneurship promotion activities are highly visible
across all the Gulf states. In Oman and Qatar, the cases of this study, entrepreneurship features pro-
minently in newspapers and government press releases, across universities, colleges, schools, and
multiple government ministries, organisations, and commercial agencies.2 Each of these institutions
have established programmes dedicated to the promotion and support of entrepreneurship, includ-
ing training facilities, incubators, accelerators, and funding schemes designed to help potential entre-
preneurs develop ideas and launch them on the market (Ennis 2015). Entrepreneurship promotion
targets the individual, what they can do to contribute to private sector growth and national develop-
ment. Its promotion therefore has a labyrinthine relationship with both neoliberal narratives and
national developmentalist ones.
Entrepreneurship can therefore be viewed through the lens of its political use as a mechanism of
government, in the Foucaultian notion, which integrates the economic doctrine of free markets and
private enterprise with a sense of individualism, obligation, and patriotism. According to Lemke, the
neoliberal agenda shifts:
the regulatory competence of the state onto ‘responsible’ and ‘rational’ individuals. Neo-liberalism encourages
individuals to give their lives a specific entrepreneurial form. It responds to stronger ‘demand’ for individual
scope for self-determination and desired autonomy by ‘supplying’ individuals and collectives with the possibility
of actively participating in the solution of specific matters and problems which had hitherto been the domain of
state agencies. (2001: 201–2)
Neoliberal ideologies also intersect with and inﬂuence local interpretations of work, gender, and reli-
gion. A study of Muslim Keralite entrepreneurs in the Gulf shows that Islam may be used to set
4 C. A. ENNIS
boundaries or justify ethical engagements with neoliberal economy (Osella and Osella 2009). Like-
wise in the area of women’s work, stories from Islamic history are sometimes used to legitimise
the acceptability or importance of women’s entrepreneurial engagement (Hürriyet Daily News
2012; Wamda 2012; Ullah et al. 2013). Capitalism and neoliberalism occupy the foundations of econ-
omic and social life across cultural and religious spaces. One can see evidence of how ‘moral econ-
omies’ are ‘over-determined by existing market conditions and rhetorics’ while Islam too may
‘permeate capitalism’ (Osella and Osella 2009: S217). In this regard, we can view social and economic
life, whether in religious or other forms, as co-constituting of economic rationalities. This can help us
understand how neoliberalism, authoritarianism, and religious views on economic life, which may
seem competitive, can in fact be co-constitutive.
This paper illustrates a tension in the experience of women’s entrepreneurship, where the rhetoric
and practice of entrepreneurship can be experienced as empowering, but can also be a means of
reconstituting patriarchal structures to accommodate the market. This is not to make a normative
argument about female entrepreneurship as good or bad, but rather to draw out the contradictions
and tensions which exist between the rhetoric and the realities, and also to underline the (orientalist)
assumptions which ascribe positive value and liberating power to capital and neoliberal modes of
economic organisation premised on the idea that women in the region are awaiting exogenous econ-
omic liberation.
Structural logic of the economy
This section examines the gendered dynamics of entrepreneurship within the structural realities of
Gulf rentier economies. It demonstrates how support for women’s entrepreneurship is met with con-
tradictions endogenous to the political economy. The most relevant structural features here include
the heavy dependence of Gulf economies on oil and gas, and labour market segmentation.
Oman and Qatar, like other GCC states, use public sector employment to manage unemployment
and redistribute hydrocarbon wealth. With hydrocarbon revenue unable to keep up with the growth
in the working-age population, this strategy has become especially unsustainable in Oman (Forsten-
lechner and Rutledge 2010, Ennis and Al-Jamali 2014). Research points to a high unemployment rate
in a rapidly expanding working-age population as one of the major concerns of oil-dependent econ-
omies. These concerns are a strong motivator of the entrepreneurship agenda in the region. Despite
some studies suggesting that oil-rent dependency significantly dampers entrepreneurship (Torvik
2009, Bjorvatn and Farzanegan 2013, Farzanegan 2014: 709–10), some view the recent government
agenda promoting entrepreneurship as a key way to reduce this effect (Farzanegan 2014: 716–18). In
addition to promoting economic growth, entrepreneurship offers a potential means to shift some of
the state’s employment burden onto the private sector and, importantly, into the hands of the indi-
vidual. This agenda therefore both privatises and individualises the national employment challenge.
In order to understand the gendered dynamics to the labour market in the Gulf, it is important to
understand the many segmentations that are present in the labour market alongside gender itself,
including nationality, sector, and class. Most scholarship that discusses the labour market in the
region only engages with the first segmentation, that is, the division between nationals and non-
nationals (Winckler 2002, Gonzalez et al. 2008, Shah 2008). This is a critical feature of Gulf political
economies. The early oil boom years propelled a demographic imbalance in the region connected
to a sharp rise in the import of foreign labour to fill a human resources and skills gap. Today, the
regional labour market is still highly dependent on expatriate workers in skilled and unskilled cat-
egories. This dependency creates certain rigidities in the labour market that are difficult to alter.
For example, policy advisers frequently point to SMEs in Europe as an example for how small
business creation can contribute to the bulk of GDP and employment growth. Yet in the Gulf, SME
activity only accounts for 15 per cent of GDP, compared with 16 per cent for low-income, 39 per
cent for middle-income, and 51 per cent for high-income countries (Oxford Business Group 2016:
21). Whereas between 2002 and 2007 European SMEs contributed 85 per cent of employment
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growth, these outcomes do not match well with Gulf economic realities (Hertog 2010a: 23). Job
growth in GCC countries adds expatriates to the labour market, contributing little to the employment
of citizens. SMEs in the region generally reproduce existing employment patterns and hiring prac-
tices, with small businesses especially keen to minimise costs and hire the cheapest available
labour. The low cost and high flexibility of foreign labour in the region perpetuates a segmented
labour market between nationals and non-nationals. Just as nationals have a preference for higher
paying, more secure employment in the public sector, employers in the private sector prefer
hiring from abroad. SMEs in Qatar almost exclusively hire foreigners. In Oman, statistics show the
largest companies in the private sector hire the most nationals, while smaller companies primarily
hire expatriates (Ennis and Al-Jamali 2014: 10). In fact, in 2015, the government of Oman responded
to popular pressure for more favourable business regulation for SMEs by exempting new start-ups
from hiring Omani nationals during the first few years of operation (Muscat Daily 2015). The depth
of dependency on cheap foreign labour contravenes government efforts to encourage employment
creation through entrepreneurship.
The other segmentations present in Gulf labour markets, sectoral, class, and gender, are highly
connected to the first. The division of Gulf labour markets into public and private sectors takes on
a particular gendered dynamic as demonstrated by Figures 1–4. In both Oman and Qatar, the
private sector labour force is primarily non-national and male (Figures 1 and 2).
Citizens are concentrated in the public sector, where women also have a much stronger presence
(Figures 3 and 4). This highlights the attractiveness of the public sector to nationals, and particularly
female nationals. The private sector, with its limited job security, lower pay, and longer hours, is far
less attractive. As well, female nationals who wish to pursue career paths in the private sector often
encounter resistance. With the private sector mostly reluctant to absorb Gulf citizen labour where
non-nationals dominate and tend to be more cost-effective, the neoliberal logic of efficiency and
profit maximisation drives these distorted employment outcomes.
Class factors significantly into this discussion, and within the Gulf nationality takes on particular
class formations (Hanieh 2010). Divisions are not merely limited to bifurcation between public and
private sectors, but also occupational categories. In the private sector, construction provides the
most jobs in the economy yet almost exclusively attracts male expatriates. Domestic workers, the
most vulnerable in the labour market because their work is within the boundaries of private
spaces, are also nearly all foreign but primarily female (MDPS 2016, NCSI 2017). This pattern is
reflected in multiple fields in the private sector, where certain professions become associated with
non-nationals – particularly migrants from South and South-East Asia. Wage levels, citizenship, and
Figure 1. Author’s calculations based on NCSI (2017).
6 C. A. ENNIS
ethnicity become tied to a perceived value and prestige of particular occupations. These dynamics
reduce the appeal of certain jobs to citizens.
Within the citizen population, quieter divisions of class and socio-economic status are apparent
upon close inspection. As in many political economies, women from certain family backgrounds
may be more willing to work in particular occupations than others. As an illustration, some Omani
women of lesser means or from a perceived ‘lower’ community status may be willing to work in
service positions in hospitality and retail, where many citizens would view these fields as occupations
best left to migrants. Looking to another example, women from elite Qatari families may have more
cultural leeway to be in highly visible public roles in their work than their compatriots who may have
to more carefully navigate socio-cultural aspects of appropriateness. The evolving boundaries of
acceptable work are continuously shaped and re-shaped by gender, class, and nationality. Certain
occupational categories, like education for instance, are viewed as socially appropriate for women.
Banking and human resources perform well. Work in health care is also emerging as a sector appro-
priate for female work (Ennis and Walton-Roberts 2017). Often families prefer female members to
work in all female environments or, at least, refrain from being the only female in an office.
Figure 2. Author’s calculations based on MDPS (2016).
Figure 3. Author’s calculations based on NCSI (2017).
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Anecdotally, these preferences seem to be dissipating as female labour market participation rates rise
in the region and it becomes more common for women to work in a wider variety of fields. Gender,
class, ethnicity, and the desirability of certain forms of employment are linked in complex ways.
These complex class formations spill over to the entrepreneurial ecosystem, which centres on Gulf
nationals although is not always exclusive to them. Certainly, there are successful female entrepre-
neurs, often tied to elite circles or royal families. These women tend to be connected to large business
dynasties or political power. Some capitalise on connections to become agents of luxury retail brands.
Such entrepreneurs balance in the shifting borderline between being entrepreneurial and benefiting
from rent recycling, a common mode of income generation among rentier classes (Hertog 2010b).
Other highly educated women have launched successful enterprises within the nascent entrepre-
neurial ecosystems in their country and region, creating training initiatives, incubators, or funding
instruments. It is in the entrepreneurship support industry where one can most strongly see the tri-
umphs of entrepreneurship promotion through the successful entrepreneurship initiatives it has
conceived.
National entrepreneurship promotion has also inspired hobby entrepreneurship among women.
Hobby entrepreneurship refers to practices of opening small side businesses to operate after the
regular working day. This practice of moonlighting as an entrepreneur is facilitated by short public
sector hours. Hobby entrepreneurship also includes small microenterprises some women pursue
for optional or supplementary income for themselves in households where men are viewed as the
primary breadwinners. This form of entrepreneurship allows some activity within the private
sector, without complete commitment and reliance upon it.
The opportunity presented by a female-run microenterprise is growing in attractiveness to women
in more vulnerable socio-economic positions as well. Omani and Qatari women from low-income
families, those who live in conservative households, and divorcés look to microbusiness as an
income-generation option.3 In global comparisons, few women in Qatar can be considered needy.
Despite this, divorced women comprise a segment of the Qatari population that especially benefits
from entrepreneurship initiatives. In a still heavily patriarchal society, women rarely remarry and
micro-entrepreneurship becomes an attractive venue for economic autonomy.4
Some women find a type of independence in entrepreneurial endeavours which, perhaps para-
doxically, preserve patriarchal structures that shape how certain forms of business activity or re-mar-
riage is accepted. A senior figure at the Social Development Centre (SDC) in Qatar noted that divorce
was a growing problem in the country, and one of the push factors for women into entrepreneurship.
Entrepreneurship was pitched as a form of economic self-help.
Figure 4. Author’s calculations based on MDPS (2016).
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You know the more that you are modernised, the more that you need help actually. Economically you need also
help. So, back in 1996, when we started, everybody thought that the SDC is a charitable organization. ‘Why don’t
you help us and give us money?’ But now in 2012, no! Everybody knows that the SDC could help you if you are
really, really want to help yourself; if you really know what you need and what is your objective in your life. If not,
we can also teach you how to know yourself and what your competencies are. It starts always from you. [sic]
Even at the local programme delivery level, entrepreneurship is framed as an individualised, boot-
strapped mechanism for private economic challenges. The responsibility for well-being becomes
connected to the individual rather than a statement about social or government failures. This is repre-
sentative of the reiﬁcation of the individual in both state and private sector discourse. Female entre-
preneurs, thus, try to adjust conservative social expectations concerning gender and responsibility
with neoliberal individualism. In this way, the ‘adaptation of neoliberal conceptions of the self
entail not a rejection of traditional patriarchal structures but a reinterpretation of them’ (Kanna
2010: 104).
What entrepreneurship offers for many women of varying socio-economic status is a way to make
their own income. The bulk of business activity focuses on microenterprises and the creation of small-
scale, consumer-driven products. Among the most common female entrepreneur booths at exhibi-
tions are cupcake creations, uniform design, and abaya embroidery. There is limited attention to
the types of technological innovations required to respond to real national and regional economic
ailments.
At a basic level, entrepreneurship becomes an attempt at correcting some of the systemic econ-
omic failures by providing a means of self-employment. Yet it lacks the focus on innovation
demanded by diversification imperatives. That the entrepreneurship agenda in the Gulf has
centred on self-employment is also reflective of much wider global failures of political and economic
systems. Like in Oman and Qatar, colleges and universities around the world are expected to prepare
students to create their own establishments with the logic that if graduates desire employment, they
can make their own. The promotion of entrepreneurial behaviour becomes part of an offshoring of
collective or government responsibility onto the shoulders of individuals.
Logic of development narratives
The second political economy logic are the narratives used around development. Two are particularly
relevant here. First, the framing of women as subjects needing to be liberated by the power of the
market; that is, women’s injection into the private sector as market citizens. Second, women as
empowered members of society with patriotic roles legitimising state feminist narratives. This
section, then, examines the overlapping domains of governance and politics which thrust women
forward as subjects of market liberalisation and as agents of both change and stability.
The narrative of entrepreneurship’s importance for Gulf women in international policy advice and
Western media points to its liberating potential. Within the Middle East neighbourhood, the Gulf
states are regarded as some of the more restrictive (Schroeder 2013: 149). With a throwback to orien-
talised imagery of Middle Eastern or Muslim women being oppressed and needing liberation from
the West, capitalism and private enterprise has emerged as the panacea. This mode of framing entre-
preneurship as beneficial to women, because it facilitates their contribution to economic growth and
empowers them as individuals, is problematic on its own (Altan-Olcay 2014, Roberts 2015). It says
nothing of the deep inequalities, feminisation of labour and poverty, and broader economic struc-
tures and trends that systematically marginalise women within global capitalism (Rai 2002, Peterson
2005, Marchand and Runyan 2010), but rather eludes to assumptions of Arab culture, Gulf culture, or
Islam as inherently oppressive.
Moreover, the purchase of this narrative speaks to the prevalence of sensationalised Western
stereotypes that have constructed certain contradictory images of Gulf women. On the one hand,
Gulf women are frequently cast as oppressed by social and religious structures, and viewed as mar-
ginalised, silenced, and hidden behind veils and embedded patriarchal systems (Weiss 1994, Al-
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Sabah 2013). At the same time, Gulf women are often portrayed as cosmopolitan and entrepreneurial,
benefiting from vast national oil wealth which gives them access to free education and abundant
opportunities (Al-Rasheed 2013, Schroeder 2013). Scholars focusing on the Gulf have an obligation
to push beyond these dichotomous constructs, cease reducing women to objects of orientalist ima-
ginings while ignoring their agency, and explore the lived experiences of women in the region, and
the range of marginalising and freeing forces at work in economic life. Through examining two diver-
gent countries within the GCC, this contribution begins to chip away at common monolithic
treatments.
In the MENA, estimates suggest that 12 per cent of women are engaged in entrepreneurial activi-
ties in contrast to 31 per cent of men (OECD 2014: 56). It is worth mentioning that the rates of entre-
preneurial women in MENA economies outpace those in OECD economies where 5.9 per cent of
women and 10.8 per cent of men are active in entrepreneurial activities (OECD 2014: 55). Correspond-
ing with increasing entrepreneurship, overall female labour force participation rates have also been
rising across the Gulf. In Oman, these rose from 7.6 per cent in 1980 to 30 per cent in 2016, while in
Qatar, female labour market participation increased sharply from 14.4 per cent in 1980 to 53 per cent
in 2016 (World Bank 2017, 2004: 59).
Due to their weak participation in labour markets, women are labelled an ‘untapped resource’ in
the region (World Bank 2004: 2). The Omani and Qatari public and private sectors are therefore sold
on motivating women to be entrepreneurial because of the potential dividends, returns, and gains
possible from the productive engagement of women in the economy. This agenda results in a
twofold problématique. Inserting Omani and Qatari women into entrepreneurship locates their pro-
ductivity in economic accounts and buttresses state narratives of supporting women in economy and
politics. The first aspect is a problem of global scope, often the object of critique by feminist econ-
omists contesting the means through which economic production is calculated in economies (Peter-
son 2003, Parisi 2006, Bakker 2007). Social reproduction and work in the home is not counted and
therefore not valued in measurements of economic development (Hoskyns and Rai 2007). Women
‘count’ by becoming market citizens; their value enumerated in market terms. Privileging women
as market citizens has resulted in what Roberts characterises as ‘a partial shift away from promoting
women’s social and economic dependence on men toward promoting their dependence on capital-
ist markets’ (2013: 26). Women’s importance and freedom are hence tied to the market.
The promotion of women in the private sector via employment or small business creation can
serve as a means of managing domestic opinion. Rapid economic development and modernisation
in the Gulf is interweaved with a story of rentierism, where political loyalty is manufactured through
the benevolence of the state in its redistributive role including the provision of jobs along with free
education, health care, and other goods (Beblawi and Luciani 1987, Hvidt 2011). Today, the provision
of new economic alternatives through forging an entrepreneurial ecosystem an important com-
ponent to reframing and re-centring allegiance on the state. Conveying these goals in terms of
local growth and employment benefits underscores the state role as patron. Indeed, the top-down
support of entrepreneurship necessitates state resource backing and thus ultimately becomes a
new broader mechanism of rent circulation (Ennis 2015).
The narrative of female entrepreneurship promotion is politically expedient for Oman and Qatar.
There is some degree of legitimacy to be ascertained by speaking to broader international agendas at
the global level while integrating these with the narratives around diversified growth and employ-
ment alternatives at the local level. Neoliberal policy goals raise the Gulf states’ international econ-
omic image while the gender dimension validates its female-friendly branding (Cooper and
Momani 2009). Female empowerment and entrepreneurship become part of government strategy
for legitimising liberal credentials in international opinion.
Omani and Qatari women are in fact frequently highlighted in media as part of state branding
campaigns; the modernity associated with powerful women in business demonstrating the
success of the Gulf state (Oman Economic Review 2015, Times of Oman 2015, ‘Qatari Women Entre-
preneurs Break the Glass Ceiling’ 2015, Balkhi 2017). Through media and conferences, women are
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often provided platforms to praise the support of the state. Thus, ‘gender equality machineries in
nation states becoming ever more embedded in neoliberal market reform’ (Kantola and Squires
2012: 383). Even in my interviews, participants regularly point to a perceived benevolence of the
state in making way for women to have more powerful roles in business, politics, and society. Gulf
entrepreneurship ecosystems are in this sense inextricable from the state propaganda one.
The promotion of women as entrepreneurs contributes to a broader state feminism. State femin-
ism usually refers to the effectiveness of alliances between policy agencies and women’s movement
activists in securing state responses to their demands (Kantola and Squires 2012: 382). It is commonly
top-down championing of women’s liberation from the state. In authoritarian contexts, women’s lib-
eration can be used to paint autocratic governments as reformers. The paradox is government invol-
vement in women’s rights spaces occurs alongside tight state controls and censorship on the one
hand and governmental withdrawal from the economy on the other (Zheng 2005). Thus, a peculiar
convergence of neoliberal advice with state-directed political goals occurs and impacts the modes of
female engagement within the economy. Murphy observed similar patterns and suggested that
while:
women may benefit from the direct sponsorship by the government, they are increasingly vulnerable to its with-
drawal from certain economic arenas. Theymust themselves find ways of reconciling the role assigned to them by
the state with the combination of other roles demanded by society and the market. (Murphy 2003: 187)
These tensions become apparent in language concerning the construction of good, female citizens
and entrepreneurs.
In states like Qatar, the citizen population is not large enough to be meaningfully productive on a
national scale. Foreign labour is required for economic productivity. The demographic make-up of
Oman means there is more productive potential, but this is not well realised in practice. Thus, like
Kanna’s work on Dubai shows, state discourse around productive citizenship instead focuses on
‘national ethics and the modes of proper and authentic citizenship’ (Kanna 2010: 104). Productive citi-
zens do not just contribute to economic growth but to the reputation of the state.
Likewise, by advocating local women in the economy, private sector actors in Oman and Qatar
are able to brand themselves as pro-national, patriotic, and contributing to national development.
The Omani and Qatari state focuses attention on individuals contributing to society by being
good, patriotic citizens. Just as men are called sons, women are spoken of as ‘daughters’ of
the nation. Sultan Qaboos, for instance, regularly speaks to an Omani pride, or nationalist sense
of self, in his speeches on national day and to the Council of Oman. A 1990s speech declares ‘pro-
ductive work, no matter how [trivial], is a key element in the structure of the nation’ (cited in
Kéchichian 2008). In 2012, Sultan Qaboos praises the success of local consultative practices and
attributes this to Omani culture, understanding, and a consistence with societal values and prin-
ciples (Al-Said 2012). Being in tune with cultural values is stressed alongside the individual obli-
gation to contribute to the nation. Being entrepreneurial and working in the private sector is
framed as a means of ‘sons and daughters’ contributing to the state developmental project
(see speeches, Al-Said 2016).
Obligations on female entrepreneurs stretch to the market, the state, and the family. Female entre-
preneurial discourse in the region advises women who want to be entrepreneurs on the importance
of maintaining work-family balance. In the words of Emirati state minister Dr Maitha Al-Shamsi, ‘only
[a woman] who successfully runs a family can also be successful as an entrepreneur’ (Kaiser et al.
2011). Likewise, the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) describes the priorities of Sheikha
Moza, the wife of the former Emir, as giving ‘high priority to all aspects that promote the role of
Qatari women and motivate them to perform their social obligations and participate in the public
life’. The same web page also points to state goals:
to establish the appropriate work environment that conforms with the familial responsibilities of the Qatari
woman in addition to enhancing equality between men and women by providing women with equal chances
for quality education, training and development to upgrade their administrative and leadership skills. (2013)
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The state, in encouraging entrepreneurship, simultaneously reinforces the role of women in their
families and societies. Rhetoric around desired economic behaviour interacts with the tensions
between a communal sense of loyalty to culture and nation and the individual burden of being pro-
ductive and successful in both professional and private life.
Logic of socio-economic organisation
Extending from the competing pressures neoliberalism has placed on economic and political realms,
women experience complex pressures from the advocacy of individual responsibility intersecting
with traditional patriarchal structures and senses of familial obligation. Interviews revealed that
young female entrepreneurs in Oman and Qatar were keen to respond to the state promotion of
entrepreneurship, and exploit the training, mentoring, and financial support available. How these
entrepreneurs perceive themselves as strong and entrepreneurial, and how they interpret their
role within the state and society, are important components of this story. These negotiations are
where neoliberal economic deepening has especially complex interactions with gender.
Although this paper has put gender at the centre of the analysis and claims that gender is crucial
to understanding many spheres of socio-economic life, this does not imply a singular experience of all
Gulf women engaged in entrepreneurship. Gulf women are, of course, not a homogenous group.
Women do not experience business relations in the same way, just as they do not experience dis-
crimination and subordination, or privilege and access, equally. As earlier sections elucidated,
gender interacts with class in ways that shape the level of necessity of entrepreneurship and the
forms it takes.
Despite rapid social change over the past four decades, kinship ties retain high significance and
social relations remain primarily centred on the family unit in Oman and Qatar (Al-Azri 2010: 137).
Gulf women in particular have faced a contradictory environment reflective of other changes occur-
ring in the region during this time. On the one hand, governments have encouraged literacy, edu-
cation, and bureaucratic environments amenable to female progress. At the same time, however,
they ‘fostered sociocultural climates that were hostile to women fulfilling the roles for which they
were trained’ (Foley 2010: 181). The oil state is said to have ‘liberated’ society from the financial
imperative for women to work. So, at the same time as women became better educated and
equipped for the labour market, there were countervailing cultural forces encouraging their return
to the home in the role of mother and wife (Foley 2010: 180–84).
Although some of these pressures persist, many women’s ideas around traditional roles have
evolved. A 2011 study found that although 59 per cent of young Gulf men think that the primary
role of women in society is to be a wife and mother, only 22 per cent of young women hold the
same view (Almunajjed and Sabbagh 2011: 39). Indeed, socio-cultural expectations can prove chal-
lenging for entrepreneurs to navigate. Although they frequently play a positive role, they often com-
prise an additional hurdle for aspiring young female entrepreneurs to overcome. Like other
entrepreneurs, women confront fear of family or societal reaction to potential failure alongside
socio-cultural norms that would internalise failure as damaging to a family’s reputation in the com-
munity. Despite these pressures, entrepreneurship is becoming increasingly popular among young
Gulf women.
Gulf female entrepreneurs experience entrepreneurship in a range of ways. Some have found it
to be empowering through providing autonomous income, others as constraining because of a
financial imperative to work in the formal economy, and others interpret entrepreneurship as a
means to participate in the economy without having to work in a (male-dominated) corporate
environment.5 As Prügl suggests, the ‘outcomes of the neoliberalisation of feminism are not univo-
cal… [but] have contradictory effects in terms of the way in which they redirect power, strength-
ening some social forces and weakening others’ (2015: 627). Different types of engagement in the
economy can be liberating or constraining, while simultaneously negotiating patriarchal social
structures that limit choices.
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Most interviewees who were directors of entrepreneurship promotion initiatives in Oman and
Qatar expressed a mixture of surprise and pride when revealing that a majority of their clientele
are women. Many claimed that not only are their female clients better prepared, more detail-oriented
in their business and financial planning, but they achieve success more often than their male clients.
This should not be particularly surprising. Young women comprise the highest-educated demo-
graphic in the Gulf states. Yet despite outperforming men in educational attainment, female gradu-
ates struggle to find jobs that match their training (World Bank 2011, 2007, UNCTAD 2014: 41). This
partly explains the attractiveness of the entrepreneurial option.
From high school graduates to college students to women in their early-career stages, every
young female entrepreneur interviewed pointed to an aspiration for freedom as a primary driver
towards entrepreneurship and self-employment. That traditional roles are being challenged, and
that millennial women are emerging as strong participants in entrepreneurial activities, hold more
advanced levels of education, and are more willing to work in non-traditional occupations than
men, is of socio-cultural and economic significance (Foley 2010: 167–210). According to one
survey, monetary independence, a sense of achievement, and ambition are among the strongest
reasons Gulf women choose to work (Bayt 2007: 14). Young millennial women have new expectations
for themselves, and these transfer into their entrepreneurial ambitions. It was evident in interviews
and focus groups that millennials (of both genders) have a desire to participate in the regional
change narrative. This is combined with a desire for economic independence and freedom.
Freedom, naturally, does not hold the same meaning for all interviewees. As indicated in numer-
ous interviews, freedom could mean freedom to be ‘your own boss’, to be ‘independent’, ‘to not have
to rely on parents’, to contribute to family well-being, to make a difference and help ‘change the
world’ around them, or to pursue particular creative ambitions.6 Freedom was used with a certain
whimsical romance around an imagined potential that successful entrepreneurship could facilitate.
Many, however, pointed to their struggles to navigate bureaucratic hurdles in the start-up and oper-
ation of business as hindering these aspirations.
In both cases, female entrepreneurs and aspiring entrepreneurs often characterised owning an
independent business operation as liberating and empowering. In Qatar, many interviewees
pointed to the former Emir’s wife, Sheikha Moza as a strong role model for their entrepreneurial
engagement.
I’ve been working for 12 years. Before 2000, it was rare to find women interactive in business or women in the
business environment. Now you find it all over. Society and business has become more open. I think this is pri-
marily because of Sheikha Moza – she is a great role model for working women. She works hard, for long hours. I
came in contact with her several times. She was really involved and working hard.7
The same sentiment was repeated time and time again. Many felt that, despite the gendered
criticism directed at Sheikha Moza in private (and mostly male) circles for her perceived
domination of certain sectors and activities, she was transforming norms in the country concerning
accepted and appropriate behaviours for Qatari women. Rajakumar came across similar conclusions
in her research, ﬁnding that Sheikha Moza and her daughter, Sheikha Miyasa play an afﬁrmative role
in the public sphere. Rajakumar states that Sheikha Miyasa’s ‘presence in the public arena as a
young woman respectful of Islamic tradition is an example of the agency Sheikha Moza has
given younger Qatari women through her balancing of traditional values and modern behaviours’
(Rajakumar 2014: 140).
Some women interlocutors did not label gender as a significant barrier to their experiences in
entrepreneurship. When asked about the greatest barriers to their entrepreneurial ambitions,
instead of focusing on gender-related obstructions, some women responded with specific techno-
logical or policy constraints related to their particular endeavour or field. Gender seemed secondary
to their concerns. It is important for researchers to keep this in mind when examining issues of gender
in the region, and be cautious not to impose external perceptions of behaviours, patterns, and
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constraints onto their analyses (Mikdashi 2012). Research shows Emirati entrepreneurs expressing the
same sentiment,
When working in my business I rarely think about my gender, I have to make the same decisions, take the same
responsibilities and look after the same staff. Who said that we have an easier job? The only difference between a
female entrepreneur and a male one is that the man has a longer time to reflect on what he would like to achieve.
We, on the other hand, have to think of our second job at home (Gallant 2007: 14).
Interviews often revealed gendered concerns connected to household obligations, and the ‘double
work burden’ that women often shoulder globally (Kabeer 2014: 67). Many of the choices and con-
straints confronting women entrepreneurs in the region are similar to those that women confront
around the world. One should be careful not to essentialise the challenges women face and conﬂate
their causation with preconceptions of cultural exceptionalism.
In fact, the business environment for women in the Gulf often defies expectations. For example,
business regulation and access to finance are considered high barriers to female entrepreneurship. A
study finds, however, that although these barriers exist, both male and female-owned firms are
affected similarly (World Bank 2007). Such findings should be assessed critically. Regulations often
disproportionately affect women even if that was not the regulatory intention. The MENA region
follows a global trend where poor business climates affect women’s business prospects more nega-
tively than men’s (OECD 2014: 59).
While legally there may be no formalised restrictions on women registering businesses in Oman or
Qatar, gender difference can be experienced through unwritten cultural codes. This is particularly
true of rural Oman, although also mentioned in Muscat, and common throughout much of Doha.
In interviews, several women noted the surprise they saw in expressions as they registered their
business at the relevant ministries and government bodies. Others noted their discomfort at being
in heavily male-dominated spaces. Women also speak about feeling unspoken pressure, sometimes
even receiving verbalised advice, on how they might wish to dress when visiting commercial and
financial sites like ministries of commerce, chambers of commerce, and the stock exchange.
Several young entrepreneurs noted the cultural challenges they were greeted with when launch-
ing their initiatives. ‘We are facing some social problems’, noted one group of female entrepreneurs.
‘People have spoken ill of us and our goal, speaking about our dream to work independently… But
we do not mind. We also have a lot of support.’8 Articles on female entrepreneurship are becoming a
common feature in women’s magazines in the region. These often encourage increasing the visibility
of women in entrepreneurship and trade shows. Here, fellow entrepreneurs urge women to have
strong resolve to challenge familial and cultural norms which can make women hesitant to
engage in SME creation (Abu Maghli 2016).
In focus groups, entrepreneurial meetings, and in volunteer organisations and events, gender
norms and the boundaries of the acceptable for women and young people were regularly discussed
and contested. ‘The mixing of genders’, as my young interlocutors often called co-ed environments,
were often the target of societal pressures. Social entrepreneurs in Doha were responsive to these
concerns. Their central tasks were organising youth volunteer activities to contribute to various
social needs in Doha. In the volunteer activities they coordinated, they learned to respond to the con-
cerns of parents and other senior members of society, even while continuing to push boundaries. At
times, they would integrate some degree of gender segregation in their activities, while at others they
would purposefully address the appropriateness of the expected level and type of gender interaction
to the participants and their families in advance. Women regularly exercise agency through their
understanding of cultural norms, and where or how much these may be challenged. It becomes a
way of ‘negotiating practice’ (Knez and Lisahunter 2015: 114). Micro and small-sized businesses
run by Gulf women emerge from an complex amalgamation of forces – neoliberalism’s promotion
of private enterprise, the necessity of financial support, the desire for economic independence,
and patriarchal constructs on the appropriate behaviours and place for women’s engagement (see
also Rankin 2001, Elyachar 2005).
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Conclusion
How Gulf female entrepreneurs navigate empowering and constraining pressures from political,
economic, and social directions is integral to understanding their role as agents in development.
The structural logic of the economy, the logic of development narratives, and the logic of socio-econ-
omic organisation each influences women’s opportunities with, and engagement in, entrepreneurial
practices. Moreover, the ways neoliberalised entrepreneurship, feminism, and economic rationalities
connect with local constructions of identity, expectations, and beliefs about economic participation
are as significant to interpretations of the entrepreneurship agenda in the region as to how female
entrepreneurs understand themselves as part of economic change. The intersections of gender with
entrepreneurship and the varieties of entrepreneurship practices, as well as with broader economic
realities and transitions such as rising consumerism, growing middle classes, weakening commodity
markets and constrained state capacity inform understandings of entrepreneurship ecosystems,
economic relations, and socio-economic and political change.
This research illustrates how female entrepreneurship, whether working from home or operating
an SME outside the home, relieves the state of two forms of pressures: social and economic. Compet-
ing social forces push for more female engagement in the market while others encourage women to
remain in the domestic domain. These forces come from both female and male sources. Thus, while
some women are in favour of liberalising social structures, others advocate for the maintenance, or
even the return to, stronger conservative patterns. The promotion of entrepreneurship within these
competing pressures allows women to sanction their active engagement in the private sector while
allowing others to respond to entrepreneurial promotion and engage in the market within the
boundaries of private space. Understanding this provides us a more nuanced view of how competing
realities and narratives can coexist.
Second, entrepreneurship promotion also relieves the state from economic and political pressures.
Responding to the economic challenges in the Omani and Qatari economies would require multiple
regulatory adjustments to incentivise the integration of women into workplaces as well as a top-
down reorganisation of certain sectors of the economy which, by design, discourage women’s
employment in them. These types of interventions would necessarily be controversial and difficult
to implement. Instead, promoting female entrepreneurship theoretically opens a space for women
to create a private employment alternative. The rhetoric of female entrepreneurship support there-
fore alleviates some labour market pressures by refocusing attention.
Promoting female entrepreneurship in the Gulf is intended to liberate women through the power
of the market. The championing of these activities by state and business actors essentially constructs
a positive, female-friendly brand image. State feminism and corporate use of tokenisation are often
recognised as evidence of progress or liberalisation. Introspection rarely goes further and then misses
how entrepreneurship advocacy sometimes reproduces certain gender stereotypes and practices.
Female entrepreneurs, as targets of top-down, state-directed entrepreneurship promotion, navigate
their way through competing tensions of state and market, traditional and progressive, global and
local, and more. Failing to problematise these relationships and interventions neither challenges
the power of the state or business elite in the development process nor their power in reinforcing
distorted economic realities that contribute to weak diversification endeavours and limited employ-
ment opportunities for women in the private sector. Moreover, it ignores the lived consequences of
not tackling the multiple segmentations and marginalisations that persist throughout the labour
market.
Notes
1. I use the term Gulf and Gulf Arab interchangeably in reference to the member states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
2. See the website of the Qatar Business Incubation Center (QBIC) at http://www.qbic.qa for an example of a state-
directed initiative aimed at fostering local entrepreneurship. Qatar and Oman are full of entrepreneurship
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initiatives run out of various ministries, government institutions, public universities and colleges, and more. These
have been discussed at length in Ennis 2015. Newspapers across both cases, where media is tightly controlled by
the state, regularly put a spotlight on entrepreneurship promotion. Examples include: Abishek Bhaya (21 April
2013), ‘Entrepreneurship is the way forward in Oman, says national youth commission’, Muscat Daily: http://
www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/Entrepreneurship-is-the-way-forward-in-Oman-says-National-Youth-Com-
mission-278i and ‘QDB and SDC launch the largest mixed business incubator in the Middle East’ (10 March 2014),
Marhaba Qatar: https://www.marhaba.qa/qdb-and-sdc-launch-the-largest-mixed-business-incubator-in-the-
middle-east/. A comprehensive list would be vast.
3. Repeated in focus groups and interviews with initiative directors and workers across both cases.
4. Interviews with experts at the Social Development Centre, Qatar, and focus group with female programme ben-
eficiaries (22 February 2012); Interview with faculty at the College of the North Atlantic, Qatar (11 April 2012), and
(QSA 2012)
5. Interviews and focus groups (2011–2014).
6. Interviews and focus groups (2011–2014).
7. Interview with female Qatari entrepreneur (7 May 2012).
8. Interview with Qatari entrepreneurs (22 April 2012).
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